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Bartle by: Melville's Willful Renunciation?

Owen McGrann '03
Like so much of the work of Franz Kafka, Herman
Mehille's "Bart.leby" nearly defies coherent criticism. Working on a level that is both abstract and allegorical, Melville
forged "Bart.leby" out of a tremendous number of ideas, leaving the reader with a story that can be read in a great variety
of ways, many ·of these readings contradictory and dissonant. Laced throughout "Bartleby" are plotiines having to
do with Northern Slavery, supposed self-discovery (by the
lawyer- which is ridiculous), a parable of the absurd, a story
of unrelenting pessimism, an ex:periment in narration, and a
lesson in why timidity is poor business practice. Perhaps the
most ambiguous tirread in "Bartleby" is the strange dialectic
occurring between determinism and free will. At best, Melville
hints at the possibility of tilis philosopllical reading; however, the tex-t is loaded with commentary on ti1e subject. One
could even claim that "Bartleby" is a parable of
Schopenhauerian asceticism and an anticipation of Sisyphus,
Camus' absurd hero. Tilis paper will be an examination of this
tension between determinism and free will with the ultimate
purpose of attempting to locate a synthesis to tllis seemingly
uncompromising dialectic.
It is an understatement to say that Bartleby is a
rather eccentric character. From the first description we get of
him it is clear that he is an anomaly. "In answer to my advertisement, a motionless young man one morning stood upon
my office threshold. the door being open, for it was summer.
I can see ti1at figure now - pallidly neat, pitiably respectable,
incurably forlorn! It was Bart.leby" (Melville 9). Talk about a
bizarre way to describe a person! The adjectives - neat, respectable, and forlorn - are not out of the ordinary, but the
syntactically odd adverbs are quite strange for a fi-rst impression: pallidly, pitiably, incurably..Already we are given the
impression that Bart.leby has some type of illness - sometiling that begs the question of how fue narrator came to tllis
conclusion on first sight (and further begs fue question of
the narrator's authenticity, which will be examined later).
Irrunediately Bart.leby is distinguished from tlle other
employees by having his desk situated on ti1e attorney's
side of the division in the office. His desk was placed there
"so as to have tllis quiet man within easy call, in case any
trifling thing was to be done" (9). Initially, Bart.leby was an
exemplary employee who was "cheerfully industrious" (9).
· Before long fue lawyer gets fue first indications tllat even if
ti1ere were "trifling things" to be done, Bartleby would not be
the one doing fuem. We are introduced to Bartleby's favorite
word: prefer. Asked to proofread some copying he had done,
Bartleby calmly replies that he "would prefer not to." The
choice of verb is deliberate (as soon becomes evident by the
repeated use) - prefer. Not once does Bartleby say he " will"
not he completely avoids the use of the verb "to be." This
. linguistic clue as to what's going on inside Bart.leby is one of
fue few clues we have into his actual mental state. In the

entirety of tlle story, Bartleby makes only one active action he shows up and applies for ti1e open position. From this
point we find Bartleby quickly retreating from this position
into himself. Bartleby's only actions (after this first one) are
all reactions- he never once begins conversation, he never
once asserts his will. When he states he would "prefer" not
to do sometiung he is not willing something to happen, but
the opposite: ·not willing something to happen. Even ti1e
(somewhat blind) narrator sees tllis. "Poor fellow! thought I,
he means no mischief; it is plain he intends no insolence; llis
aspect sufficiently evinces ti1at Ius eccentricities are involuntary" (13 , italics mine).
Witi1 every step away from expected. " normal" be- ·
havior Bart.leby retreats into himself in a sort of ascetic flight
from ti1e world. Each time he draws nearer himself he becomes more maddening for the lawyer and fue oti1er employees. We find concentric circles of walls: Wall Street, fue walls
that surround tlle building, fue walls of the building (and the
windows), ti1e division between fue lawyer's side and the
employee 's side of the office, and the barrier between
Bartleby's desk and the lawyer. Bartleby is simply erecting
even more walls - first between llimself and the others, and
fuen between himself and the physical world, and then, finally, witilin himself. These increasingly tight barriers show
Bartleby whittling away at fue temptations of life, ridding
himself of everytlling but his essential self
In The World as Will and Representation, Arthur
Schopenhauer puts forth a conception of human metaphysical reality timt is eerily sinlilar to the journey fuat Bartleby
undertakes . Melv ille probably would have liked
Schopenlwuer- ti1ey're boti1 dark and pessimistic. In order
to understand how Schopenhauer reaches llis endorsement
of asceticism I must first preface witi1 a wllirlwind overview
of Ius philosophy. For Schopenhauer, tllere is one thing-initse/f(the inner content, fue essence of the world): the will to
life. The will to life is in a state of freedom. Individual beings
tllat are alive are termed phenomena. "As fue will is fue thingin-itself, the inner content, fue essence of the world, but life,
the visible world, tlle phenomenon, is only tile nlirror of ti1e
will, this world will accompany ti1e will as inseparably as a
body is accompanied by its shadow; and if will exists, then
life, the world, will exist" (Schopenhauer 275). The most important thing to understand at tllis point is tllat the will to life
necessitates and detemlines the actions ofti1e phenomenon;
while tile tiling-in-itself, tile will to life, is freedom, tile .actual
phenomenal world is determined. A wolf kills prey and eats
due to the will to life; a flower grows towards sunlight due to
the will to life, etc.
Man, like a wolf or a flower or bacteria. is a phenomenon. However. unlike these phenomena. man has fue ability
to reflect upon himself and is in tile unique position of recognizing fue thing-in-itself in himself.
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Bartleby says something ratl1er curious: "I know you" (31) . A
few lines later, "I know where I am" (32) . In fact, Bartleby is
the one person in the entire story qualified to say he knows
anytlling - he has become aware of his state and engaged in
the ascetic patl1 to freedom; everybody else is to different
degrees (q)eluding themselves. Bartleby is able to look around
and see tl1ese phenomena surrounding him for what they are,
something they are not able to do themselves. The greatest
of iliese liars is ilie lawyer himself. At one point the lawyer
asks Bartleby why he refuses to write; Bartleby replies, "Do
you not see the reason for yourself' (21)? This is a very
(
2
8
7
)
Given this metaphysical structure it would seem logically ambiguous statement - it can be read two different ways.
impossible for human beings to be awarded free will: all will is Eitl1er Bartleby is asking whetl1er the reason he has for his
determined by the will to life. There is one loop-hole, though: own resignation from action is not readily apparent, or he is
since man is the only phenomenon that is aware of his condi- asking wheilier the lawyer does not know his own excuse for
tion, he is aware that he is determined. This being the case, not working. This is the key passage in the story. Instead of
Schopenhauer argues, there is one path to free action avail- facing this challenge, the lawyer immediately finds an excuse
able: the renunciation of the will to life. Schopenhauer quali- - Bartleby's eyes are clouded and he ob"iously must not be
fies this by stating that "Far from being the denial of the will able to see. Bartleby's honest asceticism is a challenge to tl1e
[to life], suicide is the phenomenon of the will 's strong affir- deluded laziness of the lawyer and the lawyer does not know
mation. For denial has its essential nature in the fact that the how to respond except by this bizarre rationalization for
pleasures of life, not its sorrows, are shunned. The suicide Bartleby's actions.
One must wonder wheilier the attorneys even has
wills life, and is dissatisfied merely with the conditions on
which it has come to him" (398). However, through a sort of the Schopenhauerian alternative available to him. Within
ascetic life one is able to act freely and deny the will to life.
this philosophical system, the very fact that the lawyer is in a
Thus the freedom which in other respects, as be
position of power (which is exercised). thereby makes himself
longing to the thing-in-itself, can never show itself powerless to bring about "a contradiction of the phenomin the phenomenon, in such a case appears in this
enon witl1 itself' and thus reach " holiness and self-denial"
phenomenon; and by abolishing the essential na(Schopenhauer 288). The refusal to will on Bartleby's behalf
ture at the root of the phenomenon, whilst the phe- enables him to ursurp the favored way of life of the lawyer: "I
nomenon itself still continues to exist in time, it brings am a man who, from his youth.upwards, has been filled witl1
a profound conviction tlmt ilie easiest way oflife is ilie best"
about a contradiction of the phenomenon with itself. In just this way, it exhibits the phenomena of
(Melville, 3). So we find that the power of the lawyer, which
holiness
and
self-denial
(288). he feels is the way towards the "easiest way oflife", actually
One of the reasons, I suspect, that this philosophi- ends up enslaving bini to the renunciation ofBartleby, who
cal dilenuna is overlooked in "Bartleby" must be due to the refuses any and all means of power. Here Melville presents a
change in writing style and mood. Gone are the long, high- political critique embedded in tllis pllilosophicallandscape- .
flying philosophical diatribes of Moby-Dick and Melville's the critique of power and of Nortl1em capitalism. When
earlier fiction. Instead, we find in "Bartleby" a very subtle Bartleby rejects the role he is expected to play within tl1e
and exceptionally constructed e.xample of a philosophical idea boss/worker relationship he opens the possibility of renunbeing acted out rather Hum discussed. Bartleby is a fictional ciation: because he refuses to be defined through a symbolic
exemplification of Schopenhauer 's asceticism - compare the econonlic construction (boss/worker) he is left naked and
discussion ofBartleby above to the thrust ofSchopenhauer's free. "The concept of freedom is ilierefore really a negative
argument: Bartleby's "preferring not" is a nearly perfect em- one, since its content is merely the denial of necessity"
bodiment of the asceticism that goes hand in hand with the (Schopenhauer 287). Bartleby prefers not to see himself as a
rejection of the will to life. On the other end of the dialectic construct with expected (necessary) responsibilities and ilius
lies the lawyer who busies himself reading Joseph Priestly gains the freedom necessary for Schopenhauer 's ascetic ideal,
and Jonathan Edwards on necessity and the will. The lawyer while the lawyer conciously mulls over the issue of free will
declares: "At last I have seen it, I feel it; I penetrate to the and determinism and willingly continues within tl1e power
predestinated purpose of my life. I am content. Others may · construct. One cannot be free if one is trying to be free : as
have loftier parts to enact, but my mission in this world, soon as orie begins to justify actions or to-reflect upon a
Bartleby, is to furnish you with office room for such period as supposed freedom, tlley have entered into ~ normative sysyou may see fit to rell).ain" (Melville 26). Unknown to the tem of reason giving, effectively negating freedom and enterlawyer (and there is much told us of which the lawyer is ing the subject into the realm of necessity (one ought. .. ).
ignorant) , he absolutely is determined according to
In an ironic twist that is not uncommon for Melville.
Schopenhauer 's philosophy.
it is ilie lawyer himself with sight problems. The grubman at
When the lawyer visits Bartleby in the Tombs the Tombs mistakes Bartleby for a forger. The lawyer
Like every other part of nature, man is objectivity of
the will; therefore all that we have said holds good
of him also. Just as everything in nature has its ·
forces and qualities that definitely react to a definite
impression, and constitute its character, so man has
his character, from which the motives call forth his
actions with necessity. In this way of acting his
empirical character reveals itself, but in this again is
revealed his intelligible character, i.e., the will in it
self, of which he is the detemtined phenomenon
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replies, "No, I was never socially acquainted with any forgers'' (Melville 32). What tl1e lawyer doesn ' t see is tl1at he
himself is a forger and is surrounded all day by forgers . He
constructs tl1e text in an attempt to gain sympathy from the
reader, to try to feel better about himself. The whole point of
trying to befriend Bartleby was to "lay up in [the lawyer's]
soul what will eventually prove a sweet morsel for [the
lawyer 's] conscience" (13) . The lawyer wants to be told how
great a person he is for acting so hUlllallely with Bartleby, for
taking the time to sit down and write this account of his life.
Though he spends a large amount of time watching Bartleby
stare out tl1e 'vvindow at walls, he never actually sees or understands what Bartleby is doing. Bartleby, on the otl1er hand,
understands the lmvyer perfectly well. "He did not look at me
while I spoke, but kept his glance fixed upon my bust of
Cicero, which, as I then sat, was directly behind me, some si;x
inches above my head" (19). Bartleby looks at an inanimate
object, just as he would if he had lowered his eyes six inches:
in a strange way he is still looking at the lawyer - Cicero, the
rhetorician, both already dead.
And so we are left witl1 two men who are at opposite
ends of the spectruin. Bartleby recognizes his O'vvn will to life
and his own lack of freedom and leads himself down the path
of asceticism towards freedom . The lawyer is completely unaware of anything otl1er than surface reality, which, according to both Bartleby and Schopenhauer, is rather useless.
But the problem is iliat neither of these men are actually
living. Melville (and Schopenhauer) sets up these two as the
tl1esis and antithesis - but there is no synthesis. In order to
gain freedom Bartleby needs to cease living; in order to think
he is living, tl1e lawyer must give up freedom. Neither of
tl1ese options is adequate. One hundred years later this same
basic problem is revisited by tl1e absurdists and existentialists- wiili one major change: the asserted metaphysical state
of humans is that of absolute freedom (which can be every
bit as oppressive as detenninism) .
As I mentioned at the outset, Bartleby anticipates a
move inade by Camus witl1 his idea ·of Sisyphus as the absurd hero. Sisyphus, too, is an inadequate synti1esis in iliis
dialectic, but he is closer than either Bartleby or the lawyer.
Living in a state of existential authenticity and having
achieved freedom, Sisyphus is a definite step forward. We
must admire Bartleby for the courage to attempt what he
does, but surely this slow withering into nothingness is not
and cannot be ilie solution to this free will/deternlinism dialectic? Sisyphus seems even more radical than Bartleby:
Sisyphus, fully aware of his freedom, chooses to take the
rock, to take responsibility. His rock- his burden (his life) awaits him. Bartleby, prestmlably, would simply "prefer not"
to face tltis rock. Ah, but tl1e rock remains! Sisyphus asserts
a certain dignity absent in Bartleby. "At each of iliose moments when he leaves the heights and gradually sinks towards the lairs of the gods. he superior to his fate. He is .
stronger than his rock" (Camus 121 ). At the very least
Sisyphus recognizes the rock - his world. his fellow men - and
has the courage to take responsibility for it, not slipping into
the ascetic solipsism of Bartleby and Schopenhauer.

However, despite what Camus has asserted, I have
a difficult time imagining a truly happy Sisyphus, endlessly
trudging up that damn mountain wiili his rock, only to come
back down and begin again .. . endlessly (this "endlessly" is
important: think just for a second what that word could possibly mean for hin1!). And so we are still on a quest to find our
hero, our superman. Or perhaps Schopenhauer is right: "constant suffering is essential to all life" (Schopenhauer 283).
Maybe Sisyphus need not be happy.
Ah, Bartleby! Ah, Sisyphus! Ah, humanity!
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